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Whether because of Sections 118, 119 and 120, the courts will now
adopt the view that the reasons for barring the claim no longer exist,
or whether the legislature will deem it advisable to amend Section
130, by striking out therefrom the words " * * * against a * * * per-
son who, or corporation which, would have been liable to an action in
favor of the decedent * * *," is conjectural matter. But, though the
above limitation exists, it is most desirable that we do not enlarge the
scope of dependency of the wrongful death action on the primary per-
sonal injury action. The true purpose of the statute is to allow to the
next of kin a recovery of money damages where they have suffered
inestimable loss by reason of the death of the injured person, and any
attempt to defeat this right must be discouraged by the courts. It is
therefore submitted that the ruling in the Kwiatkowski case, barring
the statements of the deceased from being received in evidence, was
quite correct.
HERMAN T. PERS.
TBE.DOcTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR IN NEw YORK.
In an ordinary negligence action, the plaintiff must convince the
jury that the defendant has been negligent, otherwise the latter will
win. The onus of convincing the jury on this issue is called the
burden of proof and the plaintiff must satisfy this burden by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence in his favor.' He must show (1) the
legal harm done to him, (2) how the accident happened, and (3)
that it was proximately caused by the defendant's negligence. 2 This
requires a great deal of positive action on the plaintiff's part and is
properly called a burden. But if the plaintiff comes into court with a
res ipsa loquitur ("The thing speaks for itself") case, and every plain-
tiff undoubtedly finds this highly desirable, he is spared a great deal
of work though the burden of proof on the whole case still rests on
him.3  For where the maxim res ipsa loquitur applies, there is a
1 Griffen v. Manice, 166 N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. 925 (1901); Goldstein v.
Pullman Co., 220 N. Y. 549, 116 N. E. 376 (1917).
' HARPER, THE LAW OF ToRrs (1933) § 77.
'Volkmar v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 134 N. Y. 418, 31 N. E. 870 (1892);
Hogan v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 149 N. Y. 23, 43 N. E. 403 (1896); Piehl v.
Albany Ry. Co., 162 N. Y. 617, 57 N. E. 1122 (1900); Day v. Metropolitan
Street Ry. Co., 163 N. Y. 447, 57 N. E. 751 (1900); Griffen v. Manice, 166
N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. 925 (1901); Cunningham v. Dady, 191 N. Y. 152,
83 N. E. 689 (1908); Robinson v. Consolidated Gas Co., 194 N. Y. 37, 86
N. E. 805 (1909); Plumb v. Richmond Light & Ry. Co., 233 N. Y. 285, 135
N. E. 504 (1922) ; Sandier v. Garrison, 249 N. Y. 236, 164 N. E. 36 (1928);
Galbraith v. Busch, 267 N. Y. 230, 196 N. E. 36 (1935); Tortora v. State,
269 N. Y. 167, 199 N.-E. 44 (1935); Bressler v. N. Y. Rapid Transit Corp.,
270 N. Y. 409, 1 N. E. (2d) 828 (1936) ; Lessig v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co.,
271 N. Y. 250, 2 N. E. (2d) 646 (1936) ; Smith v. Brooklyn Heights, 82 App.
Div. 531, 81 N. Y. Supp. 838 (2d Dept. 1903); Whitcher v. Board of Educa-
,tion, 236 App. Div. 293, 258 N. Y. Supp. 556 (3d Dept. 1932).
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rebuttable presumption 4 or inference 5 that the defendant has been
negligent and the plaintiff is relieved, to a certain extent, from show-
ing by direct evidence that the negligence of the defendant proxi-
mately caused the injury, or to put it positively, all the plaintiff has
to do is to prove the injury suffered by him and the circumstances
under which the accident occurred.6 But when can a plaintiff enjoy
the benefits of a res ipsa loquitur case? (i.e. when do the circum-
stances of the case unexplained by the plaintiff justify the presump-
tion or inference of the defendant's negligence?).
It is generally accepted that a res ipsa loquitur case must be com-
posed of certain peculiar elements or limitations: 7 (1) the instrumen-
tality or agency which caused the injury must have been within the
exclusive and absolute control of the defendant; (2) the injury
should be one which would not have occurred, in the ordinary course
of events, had not the defendant been negligent in his control; and
(3) the plaintiff must not have contributed in any voluntary way,
whether negligent or not, to his injury.
The first and third limitations that constitute the composition of
res ipsa loquitur, as outlined above, have not generally caused any
doubts in the minds of counsel and judge for the former simply
requires the plaintiff to definitely establish that the defendant and
the defendant alone must have been negligent 8 and the latter
requires the plaintiff to have been an innocent victim having nothing
' BOHLEN, LAW OF TORTS (1926) 637.
12 COOLEY, TORTS (3d ed. 1906) 1425.
'McKinney v. New York, W. & B. Ry. Co., 179 N. Y. Supp. 535 (1919);
Courtney v. Gainsborough Studios, 186 App. Div. 820, 174 N. Y. Supp. 855
(lst Dept. 1919).
5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2509, "What is the final shape of
the rule can hardly be predicted. But the following consideration ought to limit
it: (1) The apparatus must be such that in the ordinary instance no injurious
operation is to be expected unless from a careless construction, inspection, or
user; (2) Both inspection and user must have been at the time of the injury in
the control of the party charged; (3) The injurious occurrence or condition
must have happened irrespective of any voluntary action at the time by the
person injured." In the language of Lamar, J., in Chenall v. Palmer B. Co.,
117 Ga. 106, 43 S. E. 443 (1903) : "All that the plaintiff should be required to
do in the first instance is to show that the defendant owned, operated, and
maintained, or controlled and was responsible for the management and main-
tenance of, the thing doing the damage; that the accident was of a kind which,
in the absence of proof of some external cause, does not ordinarily happen
without negligence."
' The question of control is often doubtful and if the plaintiff does not
show exclusive and absolute control in the defendant there will be no res ipsa
loquitur case. See Sandler v. Garrison, 249 N. Y. 236, 164 N. E. 36 (1928),
wherein a lock dropped on the plaintiff while she was standing underneath
defendant's elevated railway. Expert testimony showed that the lock must have
been thrown and the cost held that no presumption existed that it was thrown
by the defendant's employees even though similar locks were used on the inside
of the defendant's cabs for a stranger may have been the wrongdoer; Slater v.
Barnes, 241 N. Y. 284, 149 N. B. 859 (1925), wherein it was held that a falling
ceiling upon a tenant in possession did not create a res ipsa case since the
landlord had no control of the premises.
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at all to do with causing the accident. 9 But element number two has
caused much confusion.10 This is undoubtedly due to a conclusion
that there is a standardized res ipsa loquitur case and to a failure to
comprehend that whether the circumstances under which the accident
occurred, unexplained, justify a presumption or inference of negli-
gence depends upon the specific set of facts of each case or upon the
nature of each accident.' 1 That the accident would not have occurred,
ordinarily, if the defendant had not been'negligent either in his main-
tenance, supervision, or user of the apparatus causing the injury
depends upon the common knowledge of man as to how the apparatus
usually behaves. In a recent opinion ' 2 Judge Lehman says:
"The problem in each case is whether the circumstances unex-
plained do justify an inference of negligence. Ordinarily, circumstan-
tial evidence is insufficient where the circumstances are consistent
with freedom from wrong. In the administration of the law arbitrary
rules cannot be substituted for logically probative evidence. The
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not an arbitrary rule. It is rather a
common sense (italics ours) appraisal of the probative value of cir-
cumstantial evidence. It requires evidence which shows at least proba-
bility that a particular accident could not have occurred without legal
wrong by the defendant. To negative every possibility that the acci-
dent occurred in some extraordinary manner which would exculpate
the defendant is often impossible. Probable certainty is expected and
not absolute certainty." 13
Thus, if under the circumstances of the case, the probability that
the accident occurred from a latent defect or sudden strain applied to
the apparatus, as where: a cable parts; 14 a flywheel breaks; 15 a boiler
bursts; 16 or where an automobile suddenly swerves and leaves the
I Robinson v. Consolidated Gas Co., 194 N. Y. 37, 86 N. E. 805 (1909),
wherein the decedent was killed by the breaking and falling of the scaffold
upon which he was working. The court held that res ipsa loquitur was not
applicable-the workmen, one of them being the decedent, had put great strain
on the scaffold and this strain probably caused the break.
0 See dissenting opinion by Judge Crane in Galbraith v. Busch, 267 N. Y.
230, 196 N. E. 36 (1935).
Pinney v. Hall, 156 Mass. 225, 30 N. E. 1016 (1892) ; Graham v. Badger,
164 Mass. 42, 41 N. E. 61 (1895) ; Griffen v. Manice, 166 N. Y. 188, 59 N. E.
925 (1901).
" Galbraith v. Busch, 267 N. Y. 230, 196 N. E. 36 (1935).
"Scott v. London & St. K. Docks Co., 3 H. & C. 596 (1865) (injury to
passerby from the falling of goods from a crane. Erle, C. S., said: "There
must be reasonable evidence; but where the thing is shown to be under the
management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in
the ordinary course of events does not happen if those who have the manage-
ment use proper care, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, it affords
reasonableevidence that the accident arose from 'want of care").14Duhme v. Hamburg-American Packet Co., 184 N. Y. 404, 77 N. E. 386
(1906).
t Piehl v. Albany Ry. Co., 162 N. Y. 617, 57 N. E. 1122 (1900).
" Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N. Y. 476 (1872).
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road; 17 is just as great or greater than the probability that the accident
resulted from the defendant's want of care, then there is no justifica-
tion for a presumption or inference of negligence. To do so would be
to base it on mere conjecture. In all such cases the balance of proba-
bilities between causes which entail liability and others which do not
is equal enough so that an inference of fact which entails liability is
the result of mere speculation.1s For these things frequently happen
without anybody's fault. It is not the mere happening of the accident
that warrants the presumption or inference of negligence, but the cir-
cumstances and character of the occurrence.1 Thus the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur has been applied where the plaintiff was injured by:
a brick falling from the structure of a bridge; 20 a building falling into
the street; 21 a piece of iron dropping off an elevated structure; 22 a
falling elevator car; 23 a window falling from a transom; 24 a stove
exploding because of confined water in pipes that should have been
emptied out; 25 falling through a sidewalk into a coal chute 2 6 or
through a grating in a sidewalk; 27 a cracked glass dropping out on a
passenger when a train stopped suddenly; 28 and by a train that was
supposed to be "braked" moving suddenly while goods were being
unloaded.2 9  In these cases it was decided "that the only reasonable
conclusion is that the accident was attributable * * * and was due to
negligence on the part of the defendant, for the result was predictable
and the condition of which could easily be ascertained." 30
Thus it is seen that there is no definite criteria for determining
when negligence is presumable or inferable for there is no typical
res ipsa loquitur case. The test is, to reiterate, whether the circum-
stances, though unexplained, show that ordinarily the accident would
not have occurred unless the defendant were negligent. The applica-
tion of this test, the other elements or limitations being present of
course. will tend to lessen the confusion and vagueness that attend the
"mysterious" maxim res ipsa loquitur.
'Galbraith v. Busch, 267 N. Y. 230, 196 N. E. 36 (1935).
"Tortora v. State, 269 N. Y. 167, 199 N. E. 44 (1935).
"Griffen v. Manice, 166 N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. 925 (1901).
Dearney v. London B. & S. C. R. Co., 6 Q. B. 759 (1870).
Mullen v. St. John, 57 N. Y. 567 (1874).
"Hogan v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 149 N. Y. 23, 43 N. E. 403 (1896).
Griffen v. Manice, 166 N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. 925 (1901).
2, Whitcher v. Board of Education, 236 App. Div. 293, 258 N. Y. Supp. 556
(3d Dept. 1932).
. Tortora v. State, 269 N. Y. 167, 199 N. E. 44 (1935).
'Bender v. Dazian, 180 N. Y. Supp. 461 (1920).
' Herman v. Josephsohn, 188 App. Div. 163, 176 N. Y. Supp. 561 (1st
Dept. 1919).
Bressler v. N. Y. Rapid Transit Corp., 270 N. Y. 409, 1 N. E. (2d) 828
(1936).
' Lessig v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 271 N. Y. 250, 2 N. E. (2d) 646(1936).
' Tortora v. State, 269 N. Y. 167, 199 N. E. 44 (1935).
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To what extent the plaintiff's burden is lightened by a res ipsa
loquitur case (i.e. what exact procedural advantage is given to the
plaintiff) is still the source of much confusion and contradiction in
the courts of various jurisdictions 31 and former decisions of the New
York courts were not totally free from inconsistencies.3 2 It is believed
that the difficulty has arisen in part from a confusion of terms and a
failure to draw the proper distinction between presumptions and
inferences.33
What will be the effect of a res ipsa loquitur case if it is treated
as creating a presumption of negligence and what will its effect be if
it permits an inference of negligence? The plaintiff will receive a
much greater advantage if his res ipsa loquitur case will create the
former effect for in such an instance, upon the close of the plaintiff's
case, if the defendant rests without offering evidence, the plaintiff, if
his evidence is credible and unsuspicious, will be entitled to a directed
verdict.3 4 This will have the effect of compelling the defendant to
come forward with the evidence and explain how the accident hap-
pened or else lose the case without an opportunity for jury con~idera-
tion. But if res ipsa loquitur merely permits the jury to infer negli-
gence then the sole advantage that will accrue to the plaintiff is that
he will be able to pass the judge and get to the jury, i.e. it will be
enough to avoid a non-suit and the jury will be permitted and not
compelled to draw an inference that the defendant has been negligent.
This "permissible inference" satisfies the plaintiff's usual burden of
evidence and creates an opportunity for reasonable men to find in his
favor.35 It follows that where res ipsa loquitur has such an effect, the
judge can never direct a verdict for the plaintiff upon the close of his
' 5 WIGMORE, EVDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2509; Heckel & Harper, Effect of
the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur (1928) 22 ILL. L. Rxv. 724; Note (1929) 3
ST. JoiaN's L. REv. 248.
'Heckel & Harper, op. cit. supra n. 31, at 726; Note (1929) 3 ST. JoHN's
L. REv. 248-250; compare Hogan v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 149 N. Y. 23, 43 N. E.
403 (1896) with Breen v. N. Y. Ry. Co., 109 N. Y. 297, 16 N. E. 60 (1888) and
with Maher v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 53 Hun 506 (N. Y. 1889), and with Stall-
man v. New York Steam Co., 17 App. Div. 397, 45 N. Y. Supp. 161 (lst
Dept. 1897). In the latter cases though defendant rested upon close of the
plaintiff's case without evidence, the case was sent to the jury.
'WIGmom, EVIDENCE (2d ed. Supp. 1934) §2509; Glowacki v. North
Western Ohio R. & P. Co., 116 Ohio 541, 157 N. E. 21 (1927); Ensel v.
Lumbar Ins. Co., 88 Ohio 269, 102 N. E. 955 (1913), where the court said,
"The error of counsel throughout this case, lies in a confusion of terms. They
mistake inference for presumption, a slip too often made by judges as well as
lawyers. A presumption is a rule which the law makes upon a given set of
facts; an inference is a conclusion which, by means of data, founded upon
common experience, natural reason draws from facts which are proven."
-Hogan v. Manhattan Rv. Co., 149 N. Y. 23, 43 N. E. 403 (1896);
Moqlia v. Nassau Elec Co., 127 App. Div. 243, 111 N. Y. Supp 70 (2nd Dept.
1908); Levine v. Brooklyn Q. Ry. Co., 134 App. Div. 606, 119 N. Y. Supp. 315
(2d Dept. 1909).
'Prosser, Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur (1935-36) 20 Mixx.
L. REv. 244.
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case, though the defendant says nothing, for whether the inference can
be drawn is a question of fact for the jury and not a conclusion of
law.3
6
A casual reading of the cases on res ipsa loquitur in New York
seems to indicate that the courts have avoided treating the doctrine
as creating a presumption and have decided that its proper effect
should be a permissible inference, but the true answer is to the con-
trary. Much confusion would be avoided if the courts would refrain
from using the words "inference" and "presumption" indiscriminately.
In Hogan v. Manhattan Railway Company,3 7 a Court of Appeals case
which has never been overruled and must therefore be regarded as
the law today, the plaintiff while driving along beneath the defendant's
elevated railway was injured when an iron bar fell upon him from
the tracks. After proving his case, the plaintiff moved for a directed
verdict when the defendant failed to offer any evidence. The motion
was granted. Since this case, there has never been another directly
on this point in the Court of Appeals although two similar cases 3S
(i.e. where plaintiff obtained a directed verdict upon the close of his
case when the defendant offered no evidence at all) were decided in
like manner in the second department of the Appellate Division.
These are the only cases in New York on this point and there are
several logical reasons why there have been no later confirming
cases. Perhaps the defendants in subsequent actions realized that if
they did not offer any rebuttal the plaintiff would move for a directed
verdict. In other cases the plaintiff may not have moved for a
directed verdict, or the credibility of the plaintiff's witnesses may have
been doubtful enough to create suspicion as to the truth of their
testimony in the mind of the judge so that he would refuse the
plaintiff's motion. In Hull v. Littauer,3 9 the court said on the latter
point:
"Where, however, the evidence of a party to the action is not
contradicted by direct evidence, nor by any legitimate inferences from
the evidence, and it is not opposed to the probabilities, nor, in its
nature, surprising or suspicious, there is no reason for denying to it
conclusiveness."
But the fact that there are so few directed verdicts for the plain-
tiff in res ipsa loquitur cases does not alter the fact that the Hogan
' See note 33, supra. See Carpenter, Doctrhie of Res Ipsa Loquitur(1933-34) 1 CHa. L. REv. 523. Professor Carpenter says that where res ipsa
case merely lays down a foundation for a permissible inference of negligence
on the part of the defendant, the plaintiff will be entitled to go to the jury and
a motion for a non-suit of the plaintiff or a direct verdict for the defendant-
will be denied.
149 N. Y. 23, 43 N. E. 403 (1896).
Moglia v. Nassau Elec. Co., 127 App. Div. 243, 111 N. Y. Supp. 70 (2d
Dept. 1908); Levine v. Brooklyn Q. Ry. Co., 134 App. Div. 606, 119 N. Y.
Supp. 315 (2d Dept. 1909).
162 N. Y. 567, 572, 57 N. E. 102 (1900).
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case 40 is still the law in New York on this point and is therefore
authority that res ipsa loquitur creates a presumption of the defen-
dant's negligence in New York. But in spite of this early case, the
New York Court of Appeals in innumerable subsequent decisions 41
has continually used the word "inference" instead of "presumption"
and at different times 42 has used them interchangeably as though they
were synonymous. But, to reiterate, no matter which word was used
the Hogan case 43 has never been overruled and must still be regarded
as the law in New York.44 It would seem that this apparent incon-
sistency or confusion in the use of the words "presumption" and
"inference" can be explained by the following: since there has never
been a directed verdict case after 1909, the case always went to the
jury, who decided in favor of either the plaintiff or defendant. But
how did these average, reasonable men decide in favor of either party?
They knew the facts of the case and from the evidence introduced by
both parties arrived at a conclusion, deductively obtained, as to
whether the plaintiff had proved the defendant negligent by a prepon-
derance of the evidence in his favor. That is, the jury drew an
inference (a question of fact) 45 from the whole case. Thus the use
by the court of the words "inference" and "presumption" in the same
case was not incorrect for when the plaintiff proved his res ipsa
loquitur case, a presumption of the defendant's negligence arose. But
once the case was submitted to the jury, they were permitted to draw
an inference of fact, from the evidence presented on the whole case, as
40149 N. Y. 23, 43 N. E. 403 (1896).
4' Day v. Metropolitan Street Ry. Co., 163 N. Y. 447, 57 N. E. 751 (1900);
Griffen v. Manice, 166 N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. 925 (1901); Robinson v. Consoli-
dated Gas Co., 194 N. Y. 37, 86 N. E. 805 (1909); Galbraith v. Busch,
267 N. Y. 230, 196 N. E. 36 (1935); Tortora v. State, 269 N. Y. 167, 199
N. E. 44 (1935) ; Lessig v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 271 N. Y. 250, 2 N. E.
(2d) 646 (1936); Smith v. Brooklyn Heights, 82 App. Div. 531, 81 N. Y.
Supp. 838 (2d Dept. 1903).
4' Solarz v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 8 Misc. 656, 29 N. Y. Supp. 1123 (1894),
aff'd without opinion, 155 N. Y. 645, 49 N. E. 1104 (1898); Piehl v. Albany
Ry. Co., 162 N. Y. 617, 57 N. E. 1122 (1900) ; Plumb v. Richmond Light Ry.
Co., 233 N. Y. 285, 135 N. E. 504 (1922); Dumes v. Sizer, 3 App. Div. 11,
37 N. Y. Supp. 929 (4th Dept. 1896).
,149 N. Y. 23, 43 N. E. 403 (1896).
"Prosser, Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur (1935-36) 20 MINN. L.
REv. 249, n. 47, where the writer says that most of the New York cases support
the presumption view and he cites many New York decisions. Carpenter,
Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur (1933-34) 1 Cmi. L. REv. 525, agrees with
Professor Prosser on this point.
" WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. Supp. 1934) § 2509; Enser v. Lumbar Ins.
Co., 88 Ohio 269, 102 N. E. 955 (1913), where the court said, " * * * an
inference is a conclusion which, by means of data, founded upon common
experience, natural reason draws from facts which are proven." In Glowacki
v. North Western Ohio R. & P. Co., 116 Ohio 451, 157 N. E. 21 (1927) the
court said, "Under certain facts a jury would be warranted in inferring negli-
gence, which inference if drawn by the jury, would become a conclusion founded
upon common experience." Ohio, incidentally, favors the permissible inference
view.
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to whether the plaintiff's presumption had been rebutted. It is also
highly probable, that because of the rarity of a res ipsa case calling
for a directed verdict, the courts have become accustomed to the
word "inference" and make no attempt (it not being necessary to
arrive at the correct decision) to distinguish it from a "presumption".
Some courts of other jurisdictions 46 have given res ipsa loquitur
the permissible inference effect and defend it vigorously against any
suggestion that it be given the New York effect, i.e. that of a pre-
sumption. This is a long way from concluding negligence as a matter
of law. Thus the defendant may still win if the jury does not draw
an inference of negligence though he did not attempt to rebut the
plaintiff's case. The courts sponsoring this viewpoint argue that the
circumstantial evidence that is substituted for direct evidence is evi-
dence to be weighed and not necessarily to be accepted as conclusive.
47
Other jurisdictions 48 have applied res ipsa loquitur in a manner
that requires the defendant upon the close of the plaintiff's case to
affirmatively disprove his negligence by a preponderance of the evi-
dence or else lose the case, a method which the New York courts 49
" Stebel v. Connecticut Co., 90 Conn. 24, 96 Atl. 171 (1920); Schiesel v.
S. Z. Poli Realty Co., 108 Conn. 115, 142 At. 812 (1928) ; Chenall v. Palmer
Brick Co., 117 Ga. 106, 43 S. E. 443 (1903) ; Candler v. Automatic Heating, 40
Ga. 280, 149 S. E. 287 (1929); Anderson v. Fort Dodge, D. M. & S. Ry., 208
Iowa 369, 226 N. W. 151 (1929) ; Harvey v. Borg, 218 Iowa 1128, 257 N. W.
190 (1934) ; Chaisson v. Williams, 130 Me. 341, 156 At. 154 (1931) ; Jones v.
Tri-State Tel. & Tel. Co., 118 Minn. 217, 136 N. W. 741 (1912); Johnson v.
Herring, 89 Mont. 420, 300 Pac. 535 (1931) ; Vonault v. O'Rourke, 97 Mont.
92, 33 P. (2d) 535 (1934) ; Howard v. Texas Co., 205 N. C. 20, 169 S. E. 832
(1933); Glowacki v. North Western Ohio Ry. & Power Co., 116 Ohio St. 451,
157 N. E. 21 (1927); Carter Oil Co. v. Independent Torpedo Co., 107 Okla.
140, 187 Pac. 233 (1924).
' McSweeney v. Erving, 228 U. S. 233, 33 Sup. Ct. 416 (1912), where the
court said, " * * * res ipsa loquitur means that the facts of the occurrence
warrant the inference of negligence, not that they compel such an inference."
(Italics ours.) Rosenthal, Procedural Effects of Res Ipsa Loquitur in New
York (1936) 22 Coax. L. Q. 61. Mr. Rosenthal in his scholarly discussion of
res ipsa loquitur in New York says that the permissible inference effect will
not put enough pressure on the defendant to explain how the accident occurred
for he will still, though lie offers no evidence, have an opportunity for the jury
to find in his favor.
"Jacks v. Reeves, 78 Ark. 426, 95 S. W. 781 (1906); Brown v. Consoli-
dated Light, Power Co., 137 Mo. 718, 109 S. W. 1032 (1908); Warren v.
Missouri Tel. Co., 196 Mo. 549, 196 S. W. 1030 (1917); Weber v. Chicago,
R. I. & P. R. R. Co., 175 Iowa 358, 151 N. W. 852 (1915) ; Pindell v. Ruben-
stein, 139 Md. 567, 115 Atl. 859 (1921) ; Johns v. Penn. R. R. Co., 226 Pa. 319,
75 Atl. 408 (1910); Johnson v. Grays Harbor R. & Light Co., 142 Wash. 520,
253 Pac. 819 (1927).
" Loudoun v. Eighth Ave. Ry. Co., 162 N. Y. 380, 56 N. E. 988 (1900);
Kay v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 163 N. Y. 447, 57 N. E. 751 (1900) ; Griffen
v. Manice, 166 N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. 925 (1901); Cunningham v. Dady, 191
N. Y. 152, 83 N. E. 689 (1908) ; Galbraith v. Busch, 267 N. Y. 230, 196 N. E.
36 (1935); Bressler v. N. Y. Rapid Transit Corp., 270 N. Y. 409, 1 N. E. (2d)
828 (1936) ; Hollahan v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 73 App. Div. 164, 76 N. Y.
Supp. 751 (1st Dept. 1902); Spinneweber v. Every, 189 App. Div. 35, 177
N. Y. Supp. 801 (3d Dept. 1919).
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have unanimously rejected. These courts evidently feel that res ipsa
loquitur shifts.the burden of proof on the entire case to the defendant.
But to give the plaintiff such a great advantage Would be in effect
creating a definite hypothesis of fault. In contrast the advantage
given to the plaintiff in New York will be short-lived, if the defendant
offers a satisfactory explanation as to how the accident happened-
which explanation is consistent with due care on his part.r0 The
failure to distinguish properly between a presumption and an infer-
ence and to use them interchangeably as synonyms and the failure to
recognize the basic justification for giving the plaintiff the benefit of a
res ipsa loquitur case have probably caused confusion as to what
constitutes a satisfactory explanation. The reason and common sense
of the rule requiring the defendant to explain the surrounding circum-
stances under which the accident occurred (i.e. to adduce evidence
explaining away the apparent negligence) is predicated upon the
facts that the defendant or his employees are the only ones who have
or should have superior knowledge as to the cause of the injury under
the peculiar conditions of a res ipsa loquitur case.,' But because the
defendant knows or should know.how the accident happened is no
reason why he should be compelled at the peril of losing the case to
affirmatively disprove his negligence. In Huscher v. N. Y. & Queens
Ry. Co.,52 the court wrote:
"If at the close of the entire case the presumption arising from
the happening of the accident and the attendant circumstances does
not fairly preponderate over that introduced by defendant respecting
his freedom from culpability, plaintiff has failed to make out a case,
and. defendant should be absolved."
The defendant is simply required to show only "mere neutral
circumstances of control and management which may, when explained,
appear to be entirely consistent with due care." 53 To require him to
do more would be to distort and misconstrue the intention and pur-
pose of the rule which is to equalize the position of the parties so that
they will be on the same footing that they ordinarily would occupy in
, Plumb v. Richmond Light & Ry. Co., 233 N. Y. 285, 135 N. E. 504
(1922) ; Smith v. Brooklyn Heights, 82 App. Div. 531, 81 N. Y. Supp. 838 (2d
Dept. 1903); Melia v. Southern Boulevard Ry. Co., 159 Misc. 293, 286 N. Y.
Supp. 501 (1936).
515 W1GMoRE, EVIDFNCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2509, "It may be added that the
particular force and justice of the presumption, regarded as a rule throwing
upon the party charged the duty of producing evidence, consists in the circum-
stance that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent,
is practically accessible to him but inaccessible to the injured party."
HARPER, THE LAW OF TORTS (1933) § 77, "Since the only person who
knows the manner and circumstances under which the accident 'occurred is the
defendant or some person or persons in his employ, it is necessary and proper
that the defendant be required at his peril to explain the nature and circum-
stances of the accident."
158 App. Div. 422, 425, 143 N. Y. Supp. 639 (2d Dept. 1913).
t' Plumb v. Richmond Light & Ry. Co., 233 N. Y. 285, 288, 135 N. E. 504,
505 (1922).
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any negligence case in which the facts are equally known or capable
of being known by both parties. 54 Upon the defendant's satisfactory
rebuttal, the burden of producing evidence to show how the accident
occurred and that it proximately resulted from the defendant's negli-
gence then shifts to the plaintiff and he must prove the defendant's.
negligence by a preponderance of the evidence 55 as in an ordinary
negligence case.
It is thus seen that it is not the burden of proof that shifts but
the burden of explaining how the accident occurred. This is the New
York courts' procedural application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
and it seems to be the most logical method 56 of the three heretofore
discussed. The courts of other jurisdictions which give res ipsa
loquitur a different procedural effect appear to be confused by the
mysterious and impressive-sounding Latin words. If such is the
case, it is suggested that English words with a clearer meaning be
substituted for "res ipsa loquitur".
M. RICHARD WYNNE.
Is DOWER ABOLISHED?
The protective attitude of the courts toward dower probably
needs no elaboration. Through the years dower has been viewed as
a thing apart-something to be religiously protected. In recent times,
however, the institution has tended to become a cumbersome affair.
Changing times and attitudes demanded some relief from its burden.
Finally, by an amendment to Section 190 of the Real Property Law,
dower in real property acquired by a husband subsequent to August
31, 1930 was abolished.
However, the Legislature did not stop here. Other rights were
created in lieu of dower by enactments in the New York Decedent
Estate Law, Sections 18 and 83. Briefly, Section 18 provides that
where a husband or wife dies after August, 1930 and leaves a will
'BOHLEN, LAW OF TORTS (1926) 646: "If the defendant's witnesses are
believed to have told the truth and his records are accepted as full and accurate,
the facts are known and the plaintiff is in no worse position than if such facts
had been proved by his own witnesses or books. What advantage he originally
labored under has disappeared, and the presumption based on the desire to
remove the advantage is satisfied."
' Griffen v. Manice, 166 N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. 925 (1901); Goldstein v.
Pullman Co., 220 N. Y. 549, 116 N. E. 376 (1917); Plumb v. Richmond Light
& Ry. Co., 233 N. Y. 285, 135 N. E. 504 (1922), where the court said, "If a
satisfactory explanation is offered by the defendant, the plaintiff may rebut it
by evidence of negligence or lose his case. On the whole case there must be
a preponderance of evidence in favor of the plaintiff's contention." (Italics
ours.)
'See note 54, .mopra.
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